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On the Measurement of Political Instability  








We examine the relationship between political instability and economic growth. Using an 
exploratory factor analysis we identify four dimensions of political instability: (1) mass 
civil protest, (2) politically motivated aggression, (3) instability within the political 
regime and (4) instability of the political regime. We show that individual political 
instability indicators are generally poor proxies for the underlying dimensions of political 
instability. Our panel estimates for a sample of 98 countries in the period 1984-2003 
indicate that the various dimensions of political instability have different effects on 
economic growth.  
 
Keywords: political instability, factor analysis, economic growth 
 
SOM Theme C:   Coordination and growth in economies 





*Contact: Richard Jong-A-Pin, Faculty of Economics, University of Groningen, PO Box 800, 9700 AV 
Groningen, The Netherlands, Tel. 31-(0)50-3634757; email: r.m.jong-a-pin@eco.rug.nl. An earlier version 
of this paper was presented at the SOM PhD. Conference, Groningen, the Netherlands and at the EPCS 
annual meeting 2006, Turku, Finland. I would like to thank Jakob de Haan, Henri de Groot, Bart Los, Erik 
Meijer and Mark Mink for helpful suggestions and comments. All errors are my own.   2
Introduction 
Ever since the early studies by Venieris and Gupta (1986) and Gupta (1990), economists 
have tried to understand the relationship between political instability and economic 
outcomes. Drazen (2000) provides two reasons why political instability may affect 
economic outcomes. Firstly, political instability creates uncertainty with respect to future 
institutions and policymakers, which alters the behavior of private agents and firms with 
respect to the accumulation of capital. In addition, it changes the incentives of 
policymakers who either try to increase their term in office or take benefit of the position 
they have while they are in office.
1 Secondly, political instability can have a direct effect 
on productivity, because it disrupts market functioning  and economic relations. 
Since political instability in a country cannot be measured directly, empirical studies 
often rely on indicators like the number of coups d’état (Londregan and Poole, 1990) or 
proxies such as the number of political assassinations and political revolutions (Barro, 
1991). While these indicators probably capture some aspects of political instability, they 
are certainly not perfect. Some authors acknowledge the problem of measurement error 
and combine various indicators in a single index using discriminant analysis (Gupta, 
1990; Venieris and Gupta, 1986) or principal components analysis (e.g. Alesina and 
Perotti, 1996; Annett, 2001). Others predict the propensity of government change using 
binary choice models in which the occurrence of (irregular) government transfers is 
related to various economic, political and institutional variables (e.g. Cukierman, 
Edwards and Tabellini, 1992; Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel, 1996; Chen and Feng, 
1996; Svensson, 1998). 
These approaches have in common that the used indicators are assumed to be highly 
correlated with political instability and that political instability is a one-dimensional 
concept. The first assumption is generally validated on theoretical grounds, but it is never 
thoroughly tested. The assumption that political instability has only one dimension has 
been disputed by a number of studies in political science using the principal components 
method to identify different dimensions of political instability. Although these studies 
primarily focus on the dimensionality of political violence (which is a rather narrow 
                                                 
1 See Carmignani (2003) for a survey of the theoretical literature concerning political instability and 
economic outcomes.   3
definition of political instability, see Carmignani (2003)), none of these studies finds that 
political instability is one-dimensional. Instead, the results vary substantially ranging 
from two (Hibbs, 1973) to nine dimensions (Feierabend and Feierabend, 1966).
2 More 
recent work in economics (e.g. Chauvet, 2002 or Campos and Nugent, 2002) 
acknowledges that political instability is multidimensional and identifies various 
dimensions of political instability on a priori grounds. These dimensions, in turn, are 
represented by a selected group of indicators. This approach obviously entails the risk of 
a confirmation bias when determining the dimensionality of political instability. 
This paper has three objectives. The first aim is to examine the dimensionality of political 
instability in a more substantive way than in previous studies. We employ 26 widely used 
indicators of political instability in an exploratory factor analysis (EFA). In contrast to 
principal components analysis (PCA), which is a data reduction technique to explain as 
much variance of the indicators as possible, factor analysis models the covariance of a 
group of indicators in such a way that the common variation in the variables is explained 
by a smaller set of underlying factors (latent variables). The second aim is to examine 
how individual indicators relate to these identified factors in order to assess measurement 
errors of individual indicators. The third aim is to analyze whether various dimensions of 
political instability may have different effects. Therefore, we examine how the 
dimensions of political instability that we identify are related to economic growth for a 
sample of 98 countries in  the period 1984-2003.  
We find that political instability has four dimensions: mass civil protest, politically 
motivated aggression, instability within the political regime, and instability of the political 
regime. Furthermore, we find that individual indicators are generally poor reflections of 
the underlying latent variable. Finally, we show that the four political instability 
dimensions that we identify have different effects on economic growth. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the factor 
analysis model. Our dataset is discussed in section 3. Section 4 provides the results of the 
factor analysis. We examine the differences between the dimensions of political 
                                                 
2 Other studies that also address the dimensionality of political instability using principal components 
analysis include Rummel (1963), Tanter (1966), Rummel (1966) , Bwy (1968) who all find three 
dimensions, Morrison and Stevenson (1971) find four dimensions. Sanders (1981) criticizes the cited 
studies and provides a theoretical framework of the dimensionality of political instability. He concludes 
that political instability has four dimensions.    4
instability in more detail in section 5. In section 6, we use our newly constructed indexes 
to examine whether the different dimensions of political instability are related to 
economic growth. Section 7 concludes the paper.  
 
2.  Methodology 
The literature concerning political instability has employed many different variables to 
reflect the unobserved concept of political instability. While every single indicator 
probably reflects some information about political instability, none of them is perfect. In 
other words: political instability indicators contain measurement error. To solve the 
measurement problem, researchers have frequently calculated one dimensional indexes 
using discriminant analysis (Gupta, 1990; Venieris and Gupta, 1986) or principal 
components analysis (e.g. Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Annett, 2001). Others have tried to 
predict the propensity of government change using binary choice models in which the 
occurrence of government transfers is related to various economic, political and 
institutional variables (e.g. Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini, 1992; Chen and Feng, 
1996). A shortcoming of the studies that combine indicators into a single index, is the 
assumption that political instability is a one dimensional concept. This would not be too 
problematic if all (relevant) sub dimensions would behave similarly and would affect the 
economy in a similar fashion. However, this is unlikely on theoretical grounds. Svensson 
(1998), for instance, argues that political instability is negatively related to capital 
accumulation (and hence economic growth) since it creates uncertainty with respect to 
the security of property rights. However, Bueno de Mesquita and Root (2000) argue that 
the possibility of government change, or unstable leadership, creates competition over 
policy ideas, which will lead to better government policies and will foster economic 
growth.  
In order to examine the multidimensional character of political instability we employ 
factor analysis. Although this method is akin to principal components analysis, the subtle 
difference is that the latter is a data reduction method to extract as much of the variance 
contained in a set of indicators, while factor analysis is based on a model and extracts   5
only the information common to all indicators. We will briefly discuss the factor analysis 
model.
3 
As said, the aim of the factor analysis model is to separate the information that is 
common to all indicators from the information that is unique to a single indicator. By 
assuming that the observed indicators are “generated” by a linear combination of 
unobserved factors and some individual error term, a simple model structure is imposed 
on the covariance matrix of the indicators. When a convenient and parsimonious model is 
specified, the factor analysis can be used to obtain unbiased predictions of the values of 
the unobserved latent variables.  
The factor analysis model with multiple factors can be written as follows: 
 
n n n B y ε ξ + =      ( 1 )  
 
where y denotes the observed (demeaned) indicator for observation n, B is the matrix of 
factor loadings, ξ is a vector of latent variables and ε is a random error term assumed to 
be uncorrelated with the latent variables as well as uncorrelated with each other. Under 
these assumptions, the covariance matrix of the model is: 
 
Ω + Φ = Σ ' B B      (2) 
 
where Σ is the parameterized covariance matrix, Φ is the covariance matrix of the factors 
and Ω is the (diagonal) covariance matrix of the error terms. The first term on the right-
hand side of equation (2) reflects the variance explained by the linear combination of the 
factors and the second term reflects the variance unique to the individual indicator. The 
latter shows how much measurement error an indicator contains.
4   
We estimate the factor loadings and the unique variances with the method of Maximum 
Likelihood. Under the normality assumption, we write the likelihood function: 
 
                                                 
3 A rigorous treatment  of factor analysis can be found in Wansbeek and Meijer (2000). 
4 It can be shown that the unique variance of an indicator equals 1-“the reliability of the indicator”. The 
reliability of an indicator reflects how well the indicator is explained by the factors. That is, it is the R-
squared of the regression of the indicator on the factors.   6
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where S  is the sample covariance matrix of the indicators. 
Having optimized the likelihood function, it is possible that the factors of the 
(standardized) solution of the model are difficult to interpret. In that case, we can make 
use of the fact that the distribution of the indicators depends on the factor loadings B, 
only through BΦB’ and hence the matrix of factor loadings is not identified. That is, it 
can be multiplied with any orthonormal matrix without affecting the distribution of the 
indicators. In other words: the factor loadings matrix is open to rotation, yielding a 
solution that may be easier to interpret because the matrix has a simpler structure. Ideally, 
each indicator is correlated with as few factors as possible. The rotation technique that we 
use to interpret the factors is the Oblimin rotation, which allows for correlation among the 
factors and minimizes the correlation of the columns of the factor loadings matrix. As a 
result, a typical indicator will have high factor loadings on one factor, while it has low 
loadings on the other factors. 
When the model is correctly estimated and interpreted, it is possible to obtain values for 
the underlying factors, i.e. the separate dimensions of political instability. These values of 
the dimensions of political instability can be used to evaluate the correlation with 
individual indicators, but can also be used in empirical applications to obtain more 
reliable estimates of the role of political instability in economics. Although various 
approaches exist, we advocate the so-called Bartlett predictor (Bartlett, 1937): 
 
n n y B B B
1 1 1 ' ) ' ( ˆ − − − Ω Ω = ξ     (4) 
 
The Bartlett predictor is found to be the best linear unbiased predictor of the factor scores 
(see e.g. Wansbeek and Meijer, 2000). 
   7
3. Data 
In order to construct a dataset for the factor analysis model on political instability, we 
have to take a number of decisions with respect to which indicators to include, which 
sources to use and which period to consider. In principle, we aim to use as many 
indicators as possible that proxy for political instability. The indicators are mainly 
selected on the basis of the surveys by Brunetti (1997), Aron (2000) and Carmignani 
(2003). The indicators we use for our analysis are from the following commonly used 
sources: The Banks Cross National Time Series Archive (Banks, 2005), The International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG), the Polity IV dataset, the International Peace Research 
Institute Oslo (Gleditsch et. al, 2002) and the Database of Political Institutions of the 
World Bank (Beck et al., 2001).
5  
To meet the assumptions underlying the factor analysis model we have to leave out a 
number of potential indicators. Firstly, we include only indicators that are manifestations 
of political instability and not potential causes. Therefore, we exclude a frequently used 
indicator such as ethno-linguistic fractionalization from the dataset. Secondly, a number 
of available indicators are based on each other and therefore are correlated not only 
because they possibly reflect the same latent phenomenon, but also because their 
measurement errors are correlated. For example, the available indicator “number of 
changes in the chief executive” of the Banks data archive is based on the variable “years 
in office of the chief executive” which is available in the DPI dataset. Since most 
variables of the other data sources are based on frequencies, we dropped all indicators 
from the DPI that are based on tenures in order to meet the assumptions of the factor 
analysis model.
6 
Next, we have to decide on the appropriate time period. As the ICRG indicators are only 
available from 1984 onwards, they restrict our dataset to the period 1984-2003. As 
Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2005) rightly argue, indicators of political instability are 
                                                 
5 In case an indicator (e.g. election data and cabinet changes) is contained in more than one source, we used 
the source with the maximum number of observations. 
6 One exception is the variable Years of ruling party in office of the DPI for which no indicator was 
available based on frequencies.   8
valid proxies only when they are averaged over a longer time period. For that reason, we 
calculated 10-year averages of the indicators.
7  
A problem we encountered for some indicators is missing data. Not all indicators are 
available for all countries in all years. Therefore, we only included some indicator in our 
sample if at least 5 observations were available in a given time period. Unfortunately, still 
some missing observations remain. If we would leave out those countries for which we 
do not have data for all indicators our dataset would decrease by twenty-three percent (59 
out of 254 country observations). Since only one percent (95 out of 6604 indicator 
observations) of all observations is missing, samplewise deletion would imply that 
valuable information contained in the available indicators would be lost. In order to use 
as much information as possible and to obtain factor scores for those observations with 
missing data, we applied the EM algorithm of Dempster, Laird and Rubin (1977) to 
impute the missing observations.
8 
In sum: we have 10-year averages for 26 political instability indicators which are 
available for 128 countries for the period 1984-2003. These indicators (and their 
definitions) can be found in appendix A. Appendix B shows the correlation matrix of the 
indicators. Finally, Appendix D contains a list of countries included in the EFA. 
 
4. Results 
To extract the appropriate number of factors in the exploratory factor analysis, we 
consider a number of commonly used “rules” and fit-statistics. We start with examining 
Cattell’s screeplot (Cattell, 1966) which plots the number of factors against the 
eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of the indicators. 
                                                 
7 We also did the same analysis with 5-year averages as well as 20-year averages. It turns out that using 
longer and shorter time spans does not alter the results reported in the next section. 
8 A different approach we also considered is to impute the missing observations with the mean of the 
relevant indicator. It turns out that the correlation coefficient of the identified factors with data imputation 
with the identified factors with imputed means is always greater 0.98. We also examined the case when 
covariances are calculated pairwise and factor scores were only calculated for those cases for which all 
indicators were available. The correlation coefficients between this solution (without imputation) with our 
preferred approach are all greater than 0.99. Not surprisingly, all results we obtain in the remainder of the 
paper are qualitatively unaffected when the other two approaches are followed.       9
 
Figure 1. Screeplot of the eigenvalues and factors. 
























It can be seen that four factors have a large eigenvalue relative to the other twenty-two 
factors. That is, four dimensions explain a significant larger part of the variance contained 
in all indicators than the other twenty-two dimensions. Hence, on the basis of the 
screeplot, a model with four factors is appropriate to represent the information contained 
in the set of indicators.
9 This is confirmed by a Likelihood ratio test, which compares the 
factor model with four factors with a saturated factor model. The test-statistic is 829.53 
which is χ
2(227) distributed and is highly significant at the one percent significance level. 
Moreover, the solution with four factors renders the smallest value for Akaike’s 
Information Criterion as well as the Schwartz Criterion for all admissible models. From 
this, we conclude that a model with four factors is appropriate. 
                                                 
9 A different rule is the Kaiser criterion, which states that all factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 should 
be included in the model. As the screeplot indicates, there are 6 factors with eigenvalue greater than 1. 
However, the solutions with five factors or more are so-called Heywood cases. These are solutions in which 
some of the unique variances of the indicators are estimated smaller than zero. In general a Heywood case 
(Heywood, 1931) is an indication of a poorly specified model (see e.g Marcoulides and Hershberger, 1997).    10
The results of the rotated factor solution can be found in table 1, which shows the matrix 
of factor loadings (also known as the pattern matrix).  
 
Table 1. Rotated factor loadings and unique variance of indicators (pattern matrix) 
Factor    
  aggression protest within regime unique  variance 
Guerilla  0.96 0.05  0.00  -0.06  0.09 
Civil War  0.77 -0.07  -0.02  0.05  0.39 
Revolutions  0.75 -0.04  0.07  0.20  0.31 
Assassinations  0.62 0.09  0.20  -0.13  0.57 
Internal conflicts (ICRG)  0.53 -0.02  -0.18  0.48  0.31 
Medium civil conflicts  0.52 0.04  -0.04  -0.05  0.74 
Ethnic tensions  0.35 0.09  -0.21  0.43  0.52 
Demonstrations  0.04  0.93 0.13 -0.10  0.11 
Riots  0.12  0.83 0.03 -0.08  0.28 
Strikes  0.07  0.46  0.32 0.03  0.64 
Executive changes  -0.09 0.09  0.75  0.35  0.34 
Veto players who drop from office  0.03 0.13  0.68 0.20  0.47 
Fractionalization  0.07 -0.07  0.65  -0.31  0.46 
Years of ruling party in office  -0.18 0.30  -0.54 -0.02  0.62 
Polarization  -0.04 -0.06  0.50  -0.37  0.57 
Number of elections  -0.06 0.11  0.49 -0.20  0.69 
Government crises  0.16 0.21  0.49 0.20  0.58 
Major constitutional changes  -0.13 0.06  0.02  0.82  0.36 
coups d'etat  -0.05 -0.15  0.13  0.67  0.59 
Regime changes (Polity IV)  0.02 0.10  0.02  0.60  0.60 
Regime Changes (Banks)  0.07 -0.10  0.02  0.58  0.65 
Government stability (ICRG) (*-1)  0.16 0.07  -0.06  0.54  0.60 
Cabinet Changes  -0.02 0.13  0.45  0.50  0.53 
Religious tensions  0.20 0.03  -0.19  0.33  0.77 
Minor civil conflicts  0.10  0.09 -0.03 0.24  0.89 
Purges  -0.02  0.22 -0.16 0.07  0.92 
Note:  The standardized solution is shown. Cells with factor loadings not between -0.3 and 0.3 are 
highlighted. 
 
Since the Oblimin rotation minimizes the correlation between columns of the factor 
loadings matrix, the general pattern that arises is that every indicator has a high loading 
on one factor, while it has low loadings on the other factors. The indicators with high 
factor loadings can be used to interpret the factors. The first factor has high loadings for 
the indicators associated with political violence and warfare. Therefore, we call this 
factor “politically motivated aggression” and abbreviate it as: Aggression. Indicators that 
are associated with collective protest by the population are clearly the only variables that   11
have high loadings for the second factor. In turn, we label this factor as mass civil protest. 
The third factor is labeled “within regime instability” (and henceforth called: Within), 
because it corresponds to indicators reflecting changes within the political system such as 
the changes in the chief executive and replacements of veto players in the political 
process. The indicators with high loadings on the fourth factor are the number of major 
constitutional changes, the number of coups d’état and the number of regime changes 
(both indicators). These events obviously reflect instability of the political regime, which 
we dub as Regime from now on.  
Table 1 also shows the variance of the indicators not accounted for by factors in the 
model. That is, it shows how well the latent dimensions of political instability are 
associated with the indicators. It can be seen that the majority of indicators have a unique 
variance of more than 0.5. So, individual indicators in general are poor proxies for the 
dimensions of political instability. This view is reinforced by inspection of the correlation 
coefficients of the factors with the indicators shown in table 2.   12
 
Table 2. Factor Structure Matrix: Correlation of the factors with the indicators. 
Factor 
  aggression protest  within  regime 
Guerilla  0.95 0.22  0.07  0.25 
Civil War  0.81 0.15  0.11  0.42 
Revolutions  0.78 0.09  0.02  0.28 
Assassinations  0.66 0.17  -0.18  0.65 
Internal conflicts (ICRG)  0.61 0.20  0.25  0.08 
Medium civil conflicts  0.50 0.13  0.00  0.12 
Ethnic tensions  0.19 0.26  0.43  0.49 
Demonstrations  0.20  0.93 0.19  0.11 
Riots  0.25  0.84 0.09  0.13 
Strikes  0.19  0.50  0.35 0.13 
Executive changes  0.09 0.19  0.73 0.30 
Veto players who drop from office  0.16 0.21  0.68 0.19 
Fractionalization  0.00 -0.08  0.67  -0.34 
Years of ruling party in office  -0.17 0.23  -0.53 0.01 
Polarization  -0.14 -0.12  0.52  -0.43 
Number of elections  0.30  0.32  0.50 0.26 
Government crises  -0.07 0.08  0.51 -0.23 
Major constitutional changes  0.14 0.21  -0.04  0.79 
coups d'etat  0.23 0.23  -0.01  0.62 
Regime changes (Polity IV)  0.15 -0.01  0.08  0.61 
Regime Changes (Banks)  0.34 0.21  -0.08  0.61 
Government stability (ICRG) (*-1)  0.24 0.03  -0.02  0.58 
Cabinet Changes  0.49 0.24  -0.21  0.57 
Religious tensions  0.29 0.12  -0.19  0.41 
Minor civil conflicts  0.19 0.16  -0.03  0.30 
Purges  0.03 0.22  -0.15  0.12 
Note: The table shows bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients of the factors with the indicators.  
Cells with correlation coefficients greater than 0.3 and smaller than -0.3 are highlighted. 
 
The so-called factor structure matrix reveals that the indicators guerilla and 
demonstrations are highly correlated with the Aggression dimension (0.95) and the 
Protest dimension (0.93), respectively. It can be concluded that these indicators reflect 
these dimensions of political instability very well. However, the situation is different for 
the other two factors. Although a number of indicators have a relatively high correlation 
with the factor Within, executive changes has the highest correlation (0.73). While this 
indicator contains much information about the instability within the political system, it is 
not a perfect reflection of it and the other indicators (with lower correlation coefficients) 
add information about this dimension of political instability. The factor Regime has the 
highest correlation with major constitutional changes (0.79). Like the Within factor, all   13
indicators contain considerable measurement error about the Regime dimension of 
political instability. Finally, it can be seen that purges of government representatives and 
minor civil conflicts hardly correlate with any of the four political instability dimensions.  
Our results clearly deviate from other studies focusing on the dimensionality of political 
instability. Although all dimensions that we find have been suggested as relevant aspects 
of political instability in one way or another, no study empirically differentiates between 
these four dimensions. Furthermore, our results show that individual indicators are poor 
reflections of the dimensions of political instability. Especially the dimensions that the 
political economy literature mostly focuses on are measured with a considerable amount 
of error.
 10    
 
5. Differences between the dimensions of Political Instability: patterns 
within and between countries 
This section examines the differences between the dimensions of political instability for 
which we have obtained factor score predictions in the previous section. Figure 2 shows a 
scatterplot matrix of the four dimensions of political instability. It is apparent from the 
figure that the four dimensions differ greatly and that in general there is no clear 
relationship between the dimensions. Only the protest dimension and the regime 
dimension seem to be positively related. Furthermore, there is a positive correlation 
between aggression and regime. However, as the figure shows, this is probably due to a 
few countries which did not experience regime instability as well as politically motivated 
aggression. For higher values of aggression the figure suggests no relationship between 
the two dimensions.  
 
                                                 
10 We performed several sensitivity checks to examine the robustness of our results. First, we examined all 
solutions of the factor model when one of the twenty-six indicators was excluded from the model. Second, 
we examined all solutions of the factor model when one country was omitted from the sample. Finally, we 
checked whether the factor solutions would be different if different time spans (5- or 20 year averages) are 
used instead of 10-year averages. Our results are robust for all these sample changes.   14



















   Note: Factor Scores are in natural logarithms. 
 
A second issue that is interesting to examine is how individual countries score on the 
different dimensions of political instability. Table 3a contains a ranking of the ten most 
unstable countries per dimension in the two time periods, whilst table 3b shows the ten 
most stable countries per dimension.
11 Four patterns stand out. Firstly, reinforcing the 
picture of figure 2, it appears that instability on one dimension does not necessarily imply 
that a country is also unstable on a different dimension. For instance, Italy is very 
unstable with respect to the instability within the political regime, but does not enter the 
top 10 of most unstable countries on any other dimension.
12 Secondly, a high score on a 
particular dimension period is almost always accompanied with a high score on the same 
dimension in the next period. Hence, the dimensions of political instability seem to be 
very persistent. Thirdly, political instability seems to differ regionally. Whilst African 
                                                 
11 A table with all factor scores can be found in appendix E. 
12 In fact, Italy’s highest ranking on the other three dimensions is position 34 on the regime dimension in 
the period 1994-2003.    15
countries are primarily associated with instability of the political regime, Asian and Latin 
American countries receive high scores on the Aggression dimension of political 
instability as well as the Protest dimension. In addition, the most stable countries on the 
Protest and Regime dimension are almost all European countries. Fourthly, the top 10 of 
most stable countries on the Within dimension consist of nations that are often associated 
with authoritarianism. This finding is not remarkable, since these countries are obviously 
not associated with high values for the indicators that have high loadings on the Within 
dimension. That is, these countries do not have regular elections, cabinet changes or 
changes in the chief executive.  Table 3a. Top 10 most unstable countries per dimension in the period 1984-1993 and 1994-2003. 
Period: 1983-1994                    
                                   
Dimension:  Violence        Protest        Within        Regime    
rank Country 
factor 
score     Country 
factor 
score     Country 
factor 
score     Country 
factor 
score 
1  INDIA  5.40     SO AFRICA  6.59    ITALY  2.75     HAITI  4.79 
2 PHILIPPINES  4.01    RUSSIAN  FED  6.16    HAITI  2.33    SUDAN  4.21 
3 PERU  3.29    KOREA  REP  6.14    PAKISTAN 1.98    CONGO  DR 2.81 
4 SRI  LANKA  3.11    INDIA  5.34    GUATEMALA 1.86    LEBANON  2.69 
5 COLOMBIA  2.67    SERBIA/MONT 2.79   ECUADOR  1.76    NIGER  2.59 
6 SUDAN  2.64    ISRAEL  2.35   JAPAN  1.51  NIGERIA  2.24 
7 LEBANON  2.59    CHILE  2.17   NORWAY  1.49  MALI  2.24 
8 EL  SALVADOR  2.48    PHILIPPINES 2.05   PANAMA  1.48    LIBERIA  2.20 
9 MYANMAR  2.47    POLAND  1.98    GREECE  1.36    SOMALIA  2.13 
10  NICARAGUA  2.21     CHINA PR  1.88     ISRAEL  1.35     PAKISTAN  2.10 
                             
Period: 1994-2003                    
                                   
Dimension:  Violence        Protest        Within        Regime    
rank Country 
factor 
score     Country 
factor 
score     Country 
factor 
score     Country 
factor 
score 
1 COLOMBIA  5.41      INDONESIA  3.83     JAPAN  2.84     SIERRA LEO  3.27 
2 SUDAN  3.19    CHINA  PR  1.84    ITALY  2.84    LIBERIA  3.04 
3 SRI  LANKA  3.07    SERBIA/MONT 1.76    ARGENTINA  2.79    CONGO  DR  2.78 
4 MEXICO  2.64    ARGENTINA  1.61    ECUADOR  2.63    ETH'PIA  FDR  2.31 
5  PERU  1.95    VENEZUELA  1.60    PAPUA NEW G  2.43    NIGER  2.31 
6 TURKEY  1.86    HAITI  1.60    INDIA  1.77    GUINEA-B'AU  2.03 
7 ALGERIA  1.82    ISRAEL  1.36    NORWAY  1.63    SOMALIA  1.95 
8 RUSSIAN  FED  1.74    MEXICO  1.25    PAKISTAN  1.61    ALGERIA  1.88 
9 INDIA  1.71    BANGLADESH  1.22    ISRAEL  1.61    IVORY  COAST 1.31 
10  ANGOLA  1.63     PAKISTAN  1.10     COLOMBIA  1.60     PAKISTAN  1.24   17
Table 3b. Top 10 most stable countries per dimension in the period 1984-1993 and 1994-2003. 
Period: 1983-1994                    
                                   
Dimension:  Violence        Protest        Within        Regime    
rank Country 
factor 
score     Country 
factor 
score     Country 
factor 
score     Country 
factor 
score 
1  RUSSIAN FED  -0.84     NORWAY  -0.91    UA EMIRATES  -2.08     SWITZERLAND  -1.67 
2 ALBANIA  -0.78    SWEDEN  -0.89    BAHRAIN  -1.95    NETHERLANDS -1.52 
3 MONGOLIA  -0.76    ICELAND  -0.88   IRAQ  -1.94    DENMARK  -1.39 
4 TAIWAN  -0.75    FINLAND  -0.83    SA'U ARABIA  -1.86    LUXEMBOURG  -1.39 
5 SLOVAK  REP  -0.71    NETHERLANDS -0.81    OMAN  -1.73    AUSTRIA  -1.33 
6 CZECH  REP  -0.71    LUXEMBOURG  -0.80   LIBYA  -1.73    FINLAND  -1.32 
7 JAPAN  -0.70    DENMARK  -0.75   QATAR  -1.68  ICELAND  -1.24 
8 HUNGARY  -0.70    SWITZERLAND  -0.75   CUBA  -1.68    US  -1.23 
9 SINGAPORE  -0.70    NEW  ZEALAND  -0.74   MALAWI  -1.66    SWEDEN  -1.22 
10  KOREA REP  -0.69     TURKEY  -0.73    INDONESIA  -1.64     NORWAY  -1.11 
                              
Period: 1994-2003                    
                                   
Dimension:  Violence        Protest        Within        Regime    
rank Country 
factor 
score     Country 
factor 
score     Country 
factor 
score     Country 
factor 
score 
1  TAIWAN  -0.71     SWEDEN  -0.89     IRAQ  -1.93     SWITZERLAND  -1.61 
2 SINGAPORE  -0.71    DENMARK  -0.88    CHINA  PR  -1.81    ICELAND  -1.55 
3 VIETNAM  -0.70    FINLAND  -0.87   CUBA  -1.80    FINLAND  -1.43 
4  KOREA PR  -0.69    ICELAND  -0.86    SA'U ARABIA  -1.75    GERMANY  -1.42 
5  CHINA PR  -0.69    CZECH REP  -0.86   SUDAN  -1.73    US  -1.36 
6 JAPAN  -0.67    PORTUGAL  -0.85    SOMALIA -1.68    LUXEMBOURG  -1.36 
7 OMAN  -0.66    NETHERLANDS -0.83    OMAN  -1.54    DENMARK  -1.36 
8 ARGENTINA  -0.65    NORWAY  -0.82    UA  EMIRATES  -1.52    NETHERLANDS -1.27 
9 SYRIA  -0.64    SWITZERLAND  -0.80    SINGAPORE -1.43    EL  SALVADOR  -1.27 
10  BOTSWANA  -0.63     SLOVAK REP  -0.78     KOREA PR  -1.42     AUSTRALIA  -1.27   18
6. The impact of political instability on economic growth 
In the previous sections we argued that political instability is a multidimensional concept 
and that individual political instability indicators contain measurement error. 
Furthermore, some descriptive statistics revealed that the dimensions of political 
instability manifest themselves differently in individual countries. As we differentiate 
between the separate dimensions of political instability and our newly distilled indexes 
suffer less from measurement error, it is worthwhile to examine whether these 
dimensions also affect macroeconomic outcomes differently.  
A widely studied topic in which (one dimensional) measures of political instability are 
used as explanatory variables is (long run) economic growth.
13 To examine the effect that 
the different dimensions of political instability have on long term growth, we use an 
augmented version of the model of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and Islam (1995)
14 
who derive the specification of their empirical model from the Solow (1956) model. As 
the model is used to examine the differences between the dimensions of political 
instability, we do not intensively examine the robustness of our results nor do we address 
the possibility of joint endogeneity of political instability and economic growth.
15  
The model we estimate is as follows:  
 
it it it i it growth ε γ β µ α + + + + = X Z ln ln ln  
 
where growthit represents the average economic growth per capita for country i in period t 
(1984-1993 and 1994-2003, respectively). Zit is a vector with explanatory variables used 
by Mankiw et al. (1992). The vector includes the real gross-domestic product per capita 
(in 2000 US$) of country i at the beginning of period t, Investment, i.e., the average gross 
                                                 
13 Examples include Gupta (1990), Londregan and Poole (1990), Barro (1991), Levine and Renelt (1992), 
Alesina et al. (1996), Perotti (1996), Ades and Chua (1997), Easterly and Levine (1997), Sala-i-Martin 
(1997) Chen and Feng (1997), Easterly (2001), Alesina et al. (2003)  Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller 
(2004) and Sturm and de Haan (2005) 
14 The only difference between our model and the model of Mankiw et al. (1992) is that we use a fixed 
effects panel model with 2 time periods (1984-1993 and 1994-2003), while they use a cross-section model 
for the period 1960-1989. The main difference between our model and that of Islam (1995) is that we 
consider 10-year averages instead of 5-year averages to proxy for long-term economic growth. 
15 See De Haan and Sturm (2005) for a further discussion on robustness issues. See Alesina et al. (1996) or 
Perotti (1996), for instance, on the simultaneity in the relationship between political  instability and 
economic growth.   19
domestic investment relative to GDP for country i  in period t,  Secondary School 
Enrollment (the percentage of the population above 15 that started with secondary 
schooling in country i at the start of period t)
16 and the growth of the population in period 
t in country i. Apart from the schooling variable, which is obtained from the Barro-Lee 
dataset (Barro and Lee, 2000), all variables are taken from the “World Bank 
Development indicators 2005”.
17 The vector Xit contains the variables reflecting the 
various dimensions of political instability of country i in period t. The correlation matrix 
of the explanatory variables is shown in appendix C. 
Since our dataset contains two periods, we allow for country specific effects in the 
regressions (indicated by µi in the model specification). This reduces potential 
endogeneity problems to the extent that the identified dimensions of political instability 
are correlated with country-specific (time invariant) characteristics. An F-test examining 
the hypothesis that all country specific effects equal zero is soundly rejected at the 5 
percent significance level for all specifications. Moreover, Hausman tests (Hausman, 
1978) comparing the estimates of a fixed effects model with the estimates of a random 
effects model all reject the null-hypothesis that the set of estimates do not differ 
systematically. On the basis of both tests, we conclude that the model specification 
should include country specific effects. Furthermore, the specification of the model is 
also not rejected by the more general Ramsey RESET test of specification error (Ramsey, 
1969). Finally, we also checked whether the disturbance term is heteroscedastic. The 
White test (White, 1980) could not reject the null-hypothesis of homoscedastic 
disturbances for all specifications. 
Our estimation results are shown in table 4.   
                                                 
16 The Barro-Lee dataset on schooling contains only data for the years 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000. 
To approximate begin of period schooling we use the values of 1980 and 1990. We also estimated the 
models with the values of 1985 and 1995, but this did not alter any of the results. 
17 We also estimated the models using the real GDP per capita indicator of the IMF world economic 
outlook. The reported results remain unchanged when using the alternative dependent variable.   20
 
Table 4. Estimation Results 
Dependent variable                         
Real GDP Growth per capita                 
   (I) (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V)  (VI)  (VII)  (VIII) 
GDP per capita (begin of period)  -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 
    (-4.81)* (-4.89)* (-4.89)* (-4.91)* (-5.43)* (-4.76)* (-6.03)* (-5.92)* 
Investment  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
    (3.12)* (2.69)* (3.16)* (2.65)* (3.31)* (3.36)* (1.85)** (2.25)* 
Secondary school enrollment  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
    (2.28)* (2.37)* (2.32)* (2.11)* (1.77)** (1.89)**  (1.41)  (0.93) 
Population Growth  -0.21 -0.25 -0.25 -0.16 -0.20 -0.06  0.16  0.19 
    (-0.44) (-0.53) (-0.52) (-0.34) (-0.46)* (-0.12)  (0.37)  (0.43) 
Revolutions and Coups   -0.01            
     (-1.57)            
Assassinations     -0.01       
       (-0.91)          
Aggression      0.00      0.00 
        (-1.15)      (-0.29) 
Protest       -0.01     -0.01 
         (-3.85)*     (-2.41)* 
Within         0.01    0.01 
          (1.35)    (1.04) 
Regime         -0.02  -0.02 
           (-3.97)*  (-2.83)* 
           
Within R-Squared  0.32 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.43 0.34 0.43 0.49 
Observations  184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 
Countries   98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
           
F-test Fixed Effects  2.12 2.12 2.11 2.14 2.59 2.15 2.31 2.54 
p-value   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hausman test  22.31 22.44  23.1  23.72 35.63 26.48 32.93 47.35 
p-value   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ramsey RESET test  0.66 0.44 1.20 0.98 1.08 0.80 0.14 0.42 
p-value   0.42 0.51 0.28 0.33 0.30 0.37 0.71 0.52 
White test  7.34 6.18 8.35 8.54 6.55 8.13 5.58 7.62 
p-value   0.12 0.29 0.14 0.13 0.26 0.15 0.35 0.37 
Note: All variables are in natural logarithms. Panel estimates contain country specific fixed effects.  
t-values shown in parenthesis. * = significant at 5% level, ** = significant at 10% level 
 
The first column shows the results of the baseline specification of Mankiw et al. (1992). 
The variables of the baseline model all have the expected sign, but are not all statistically 
significant. Although our model controls for country specific effects, the estimates 
confirm the findings of Mankiw et al. (1992) that initial GDP levels and the (human) 
capital stock are significantly related to real GDP growth per capita, while population   21
growth is not a determinant of real GDP growth per capita. In the second and third 
column, we show the model estimates when two frequently used variables (i.e. the sum of 
revolutions and coups and the number of political assassinations) are used as proxies for 
political instability.
18 Since the models are estimated in natural logarithms we can 
interpret the estimated coefficients as elasticities. It can be seen that the estimated 
elasticities of these proxies for political instability are both -0.01 and are not significantly 
different from zero. Furthermore, the increase of the (within) R-squared of these models 
relative to the baseline specification is very small. On the basis of these indicators two 
conclusions could be drawn. Either political instability is unrelated to economic growth, 
or the relationship between political instability and economic growth is blurred by 
measurement error. Columns 4-7 show the estimates in which one of the four latent 
dimensions of political instability is added to the baseline model. The results indicate that 
the separate dimensions of political instability do not affect economic growth in a similar 
fashion. The estimated elasticities of the political instability variables differ both in size 
and significance. The Aggression dimension has a negative impact on economic growth, 
but the estimates are very close to zero and are not significantly different from zero. The 
Within dimension has a moderate positive impact on economic growth, but is also 
statistically insignificant. At first sight, the positive coefficient might be surprising. 
However, as illustrated in the previous section, this dimension also reflects the presence 
of democracy (or lack thereof) and there is some recent evidence suggesting that 
democracy has a positive impact on economic growth (see, e.g. Plümper and Martin, 
2003). The Protest dimension is significantly different from zero and has an elasticity of -
0.01. In other words: the estimate indicates that a one-hundred percent increase in civil 
protest decreases the growth rate with one percent. Moreover, the part of the variance in 
per capita real GDP growth that is explained by the model markedly increases when the 
Protest variable is added to the model. Finally, the Regime dimension has a negative 
impact on economic growth and is also significant at the five percent significance level. 
The estimate indicates that a hundred percent increase in regime instability decreases the 
growth rate with two percent. Again, the (within) R-squared is substantially higher than 
in the baseline specification as well as the specification in which only the sum of coups 
                                                 
18 Examples are mentioned in footnote 12.   22
and variables are used to proxy for political instability.
19 The last column shows the 
estimates when all dimensions of political instability are included in the model. The 
results of this encompassing model do not differ from the other findings. However, the 
latter specification allows us to test the linear hypothesis that all political instability 
dimensions are equal. The F-test rejects the null hypothesis at the 5 percent significance 
level.
20 From this we conclude that the different dimensions of political instability have 
different effects on economic growth. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we examined the dimensionality of political instability using an exploratory 
factor analysis. In contrast to earlier studies we find that political instability has four 
dimensions. These dimensions are: civil protest, politically motivated aggression, 
instability within the political regime, and instability of the political regime. Secondly, 
simple correlation coefficients illustrate that individual indicators generally are poor 
reflections of the underlying latent dimension of political instability. Moreover, political 
instability indicators used in previous studies often do not reflect the concept the 
researchers have in mind when they examine the effect of political instability on 
economic outcomes. Finally, we examined to which extent the dimensions of political 
instability are different. Using a model similar to Mankiw et al (1992) we show that the 
four political instability dimensions have different effects on long run economic growth. 
We find that only instability of the political regime and civil protest are significantly 
related to long run economic growth and that a hundred percent increase of these 
dimensions is associated with a lower real per capita growth rate of two percent and one 
percent, respectively. Furthermore, the model including our indices for political 
instability explains a substantially larger part of the variance of the growth rate than an 
                                                 
19 In order to examine parameter constancy we estimated the same models with regional (Latin America, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East\North Africa, Eastern Europe, South Asia, East Asia and OECD), income 
(low, lower-middle, upper middle and high income countries according to World Bank definitions) and 
polity (democratic, partly democratic and non democratic) specific coefficients for all political instability 
variables. When testing the linear restriction that all regional (or income or polity) coefficients are equal, 
we find that there is no parameter heterogeneity with respect to income level and the political system for 
any of the political instability variables. However, we do find that the effect of within instability on 
economic growth is significantly different in OECD (23 countries) and in Eastern European countries (4 
countries). For these countries the estimated elasticity is -0.03 and 0.13, respectively.   
20 The test statistic is 2.75 and F(3,78) distributed. The p-value is 0.048.    23
often used proxy for political instability being the sum of political revolutions and coups. 
We want to emphasize here that the economic implications of our results still have to be 
taken with care. An important issue which is not addressed in this paper, for example, is 
the possibility of reverse causality between economic growth and political instability. In 
addition, issues that receive increasing interest in the growth literature such as the 
importance of influential observations and model uncertainty are not dealt with. These 
issues obviously provide opportunities for further research. Nevertheless, our results 
strongly indicate that considering political instability as a one dimensional phenomenon 
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Appendix A. List of variables, definitions and sources  
 
Indicator definition  Source 
Assassinations  Any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high 
government official or politician 
Banks (2005) 
Cabinet changes  The number of times in a year that a new premier is named and/or 
50% of the cabinet posts are occupied by new ministers. 
Banks (2005) 
Civil war  dummy variable, 1 if at least 1000 battle related deaths per year in a 
conflict between the government of a state and internal opposition 
groups without foreign intervention and 0 otherwise. 
Gleditsch et 
al. (2002) 
Coups d’etat  The number of extraconstitutional or forced changes in the top 
government elite and/or its effective control of the nation's power 





Any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of 
the present regime, excluding situations of revolt aimed at such 
overthrow 
Banks (2005) 
Demonstrations  Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary 
purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government 
policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-
foreign nature 
Banks (2005) 
Ethnic tensions  An assessment of the degree of tensions within a country which is 




The number of times in a year that effective control of the executive 
Dower changes hands. 
Banks (2005) 
Fractionalization  The probability that two deputies picked at random from the legislature 
will be of different parties. 




An assessment of the governments ability to carry out its declared 
programs and its ability to stay in office 
ICRG 
Guerilla warfare  Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by independent 
bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the 
present regime. 
Banks (2005) 
Internal conflicts  an assessment of political violence in the country and its actual or 





The number of basic alterations in a state's constitutional structure, the 
extreme case being the adoption of a new constitution that significantly 




Dummy variable, 1 if there are more than 25 battle related deaths per 
year and a total conflict history of more than 1000 battle related 
deaths, but fewer than 1000 per year (between the government of a 






Dummy variable, 1 if there are at least 25 battle related deaths per 
year for every year in the period in a conflict between the government 
of a state and internal opposition groups, without foreign intervention 





The number of elections held for the lower house of a national 
legislature in a given year. 
Banks (2005) 
Polarization  Maximum polarization between the executive party and the four 
principle parties of the legislature. 
Beck et al. 
(2001) 
Years of ruling 
party in office  
Number of years that the party of the chief executive has been in office Beck et al. 
(2001) 
Purges  Number of systematic repressions (or eliminations) by jailing or 
execution of political opposition within the rank of the regime or the 
opposition 
Banks (2005)   28
Regime changes 
(I) 
Dummy variable, 1 if the variable "durable" is 0 in the polity IV dataset, 
which means that a new regime has started or that the state is in 




Dummy variable, 1 if according to the Banks data archive the type of 




An assessment of the degree of tensions within a country which is 
attributable to religious divisions 
ICRG 
Revolutions  Any illegal or forced change in the top governmental elite, any attempt 
at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion 
whose aim is independence from the central government. 
Banks (2005) 
riots  Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving 
the use of physical force 
Banks (2005) 
Number of veto 
players who drop 
from office 
The percent of veto players that drop from the government given the 
senate does not change 
Beck et al. 
(2001) 
Strikes  Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves 
more than one employer and that is aimed at national government 
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guerilla 0.61 0.20 1.00
crises 0.26 0.42 0.28 1.00
purges 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.03 1.00
riots 0.16 0.49 0.30 0.23 0.07 1.00
revol 0.47 0.08 0.77 0.29 0.04 0.11 1.00
demons 0.25 0.49 0.22 0.35 0.20 0.80 0.18 1.00
coups -0.02 0.05 0.10 0.04 -0.06 0.00 0.29 -0.05 1.00
majchang 0.02 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.11 0.27 0.13 0.55 1.00
cabchang 0.18 0.22 0.15 0.47 0.00 0.23 0.27 0.25 0.31 0.41 1.00
execchang 0.20 0.33 0.09 0.52 -0.02 0.17 0.15 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.50 1.00
numelect 0.12 0.23 -0.04 0.15 -0.02 0.08 -0.06 0.16 -0.12 -0.12 0.15 0.34 1.00
regichange 0.12 0.09 0.22 0.24 0.08 0.11 0.35 0.19 0.39 0.62 0.33 0.19 -0.18 1.00
govstab 0.14 0.27 0.30 0.22 0.15 0.16 0.28 0.13 0.29 0.42 0.26 0.18 -0.05 0.29 1.00
ethtension 0.06 0.08 0.43 0.20 0.13 0.24 0.45 0.15 0.23 0.36 0.24 0.00 -0.23 0.35 0.48 1.00
reltension 0.09 0.08 0.23 0.11 0.00 0.17 0.21 0.05 0.19 0.25 0.15 -0.01 -0.27 0.19 0.21 0.41 1.00
intcon 0.34 0.20 0.58 0.21 0.06 0.15 0.57 0.10 0.30 0.39 0.27 0.03 -0.27 0.36 0.66 0.69 0.47 1.00
prtyin -0.14 -0.14 -0.12 -0.19 0.25 0.07 -0.12 0.15 -0.10 0.11 -0.28 -0.30 -0.19 0.13 0.01 0.04 -0.05 -0.14 1.00
frac 0.15 0.20 0.00 0.23 -0.24 0.00 -0.01 0.05 -0.13 -0.29 0.15 0.31 0.34 -0.09 -0.34 -0.23 -0.17 -0.25 -0.54 1.00
polariz -0.03 0.12 -0.12 0.13 -0.16 -0.07 -0.13 0.01 -0.14 -0.29 -0.10 0.19 0.38 -0.28 -0.26 -0.29 -0.29 -0.35 -0.34 0.61 1.00
stabns 0.24 0.31 0.16 0.43 0.01 0.18 0.23 0.27 0.18 0.14 0.40 0.67 0.30 0.12 0.15 -0.01 -0.10 0.00 -0.29 0.31 0.18 1.00
MinCiv 0.08 0.06 0.18 0.08 0.09 0.19 0.20 0.11 0.20 0.20 0.12 0.07 -0.06 0.22 0.16 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.00 -0.07 -0.18 0.11 1.00
MedCiv 0.23 0.09 0.48 0.20 0.12 0.13 0.48 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.13 0.34 0.26 0.36 -0.07 -0.01 -0.06 0.05 0.06 1.00
CivWar 0.46 0.09 0.74 0.20 0.00 0.14 0.63 0.10 0.21 0.17 0.14 0.03 -0.08 0.13 0.24 0.38 0.28 0.54 -0.16 -0.03 -0.09 0.11 0.08 0.28 1.00
Bregichang 0.07 0.07 0.17 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.31 -0.01 0.46 0.51 0.21 0.12 -0.17 0.31 0.27 0.29 0.34 0.43 -0.14 -0.11 -0.18 0.08 0.19 0.08 0.25 1.00  30
Appendix C. Correlation matrix of independent variables 
  GDP Cap  Investment Schooling Pop growth  aggression  protest  regime  within 
Gdp per cap  1.00               
Investment 0.25  1.00            
Sec. School enrol.  0.71  0.24  1.00           
Pop growth  -0.57  -0.16  -0.56  1.00         
aggression -0.34  -0.20  -0.20 0.23  1.00       
protest -0.26  0.02  -0.10  0.17  0.29  1.00     
regime -0.65  -0.25  -0.54  0.43  0.36  0.42  1.00   
within 0.38  -0.12  0.33  -0.37 0.03  -0.10  -0.14  1.00 
Notes: independent variables are in natural logarithms. Correlation coefficients are calculated sample-wise. N=184.  31
Appendix D. List of Countries  
 
# Country notes  # Country notes # Country notes
1  ALBANIA O;  -  44 GUYANA O; * 87 PANAMA O; *
2  ALGERIA  X1; *   45 HAITI X2; * 88 PAPUA NEW G  O; *
3  ANGOLA O;  -  46 HONDURAS O; * 89 PARAGUAY  O; *
4  ARGENTINA O;  * 47 HUNGARY O; * 90 PERU  O; *
5  AUSTRALIA O;  *  48 ICELAND X; * 91 PHILIPPINES  O; *
6  AUSTRIA O;  *  49 INDIA O; * 92 POLAND O; 2
7 BAHAMAS  X;  -  50 INDONESIA O; * 93 PORTUGAL O; *
8 BAHRAIN  X;  *  51 IRAN X2; * 94 QATAR  X; -
9 BANGLADESH  X;  *  52 IRAQ O; - 95 ROMANIA O; 2
10  BELGIUM  O; *  53 IRELAND O; * 96 RUSSIAN FED  X1; 2
11 BOLIVIA  O; *  54 ISRAEL O; * 97 SA'U ARABIA X; -
12 BOTSWANA O;  * 55 ITALY O; * 98 SENEGAL  O; *
13  BRAZIL  O; *  56 IVORY COAST O; - 99 SERBIA/MONT  O; 2
14 BRUNEI  X;  -  57 JAMAICA O; * 100 SIERRA LEO  X1; *
15 BULGARIA O;  *  58 JAPAN O; * 101 SINGAPORE  O; *
16 BURKNA FASO X2;-  59 JORDAN X; * 102 SLOVAK REP  O; *
17 CAMEROON  O;  *  60 KENYA O; * 103 SO AFRICA O; *
18 CANADA  O; *  61 KOREA PR O; - 104 SOMALIA X1; -
19  CHILE  X2; *  62 KOREA REP O; * 105 SPAIN  O; *
20  CHINA PR  O; *  63 KUWAIT X; 1 106 SRI LANKA O; *
21 COLOMBIA O;  *  64 LEBANON O; - 107 SUDAN  O; 2
22 CONGO  DR  X1;  *  65 LIBERIA O; - 108 SURINAME X2; -
23 CONGO  REP  O;  2  66 LIBYA X; - 109 SWEDEN O; *
24 COSTA  RICA O;  *  67 LUXEMBOURG X; - 110 SWITZERLAND  X; *
25 CUBA O;  -  68 MADAGASCAR O; - 111 SYRIA O; *
26 CYPRUS  X;  -  69 MALAWI O; * 112 TAIWAN  X2; -
27  CZECH REP  O; 2  70 MALAYSIA X; * 113 TANZANIA O; 2
28 DENMARK  O;  *  71 MALI O; * 114 THAILAND  X; *
29  DOMIN REP  O; *  72 MALTA X; - 115 TOGO O; *
30 ECUADOR  O;  *  73 MEXICO O; * 116 TRINIDAD  O; *
31 EGYPT  O;  *  74 MONGOLIA O; - 117 TUNISIA O; *
32  EL SALVADOR  O; *  75 MOROCCO X; - 118 TURKEY  O; *
33  ETH'PIA FDR  O; -  76 MOZAMBIQUE O; * 119 UA EMIRATES  X; -
34 FINLAND  O;  *  77 MYANMAR X1; - 120 UGANDA O; *
35 FRANCE  O;  *  78 NAMIBIA X2; 2 121 UK O; *
36 GABON  O;  -  79 NETHERLANDS O; * 122 URUGUAY  O; *
37 GAMBIA  X1; *  80 NEW ZEALAND O; * 123 US O; *
38 GERMANY  O;  *  81 NICARAGUA O; * 124 VENEZUELA X1; *
39 GHANA X2;  *  82 NIGER X2; * 125 VIETNAM  O; 2
40 GREECE  O;  *  83 NIGERIA X; - 126 YEMEN REP  X2; 2
41 GUATEMALA O;  *  84 NORWAY O; * 127 ZAMBIA O;  *
42 GUINEA  X2; -  85 OMAN X; - 128 ZIMBABWE  O; *
43 GUINEA-B'AU O;  *  86 PAKISTAN O; *  
Notes:  O  = all indicators used in the EFA are available, X1= all indicators used in the EFA are only 
available for the period 1984-1993 (period 1984-2003 contains some imputed values), X2 = all indicators 
used in the EFA are only available for the period 1994-2003 (period 1984-1993 contains some imputed 
values). * = country is included in the sample of the panel regression model of section 6. 1 = all economic 
control variables are only available for the period 1984-1993. 2 = all economic control variables are only 
available for the period 1994-2003. - = both periods contain missing values for the economic control 
variables. 
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Appendix E. Political instability factor scores. 
 
country  violence     protest     regime     within    
    84-93  94-03 84-93 94-03 84-93 94-03 84-93 94-03 
ALBANIA  -0.78 -0.55 1.22 0.48 1.58 0.49 -0.15 0.92 
ALGERIA  -0.45 1.82 0.50 -0.41 1.66 1.88 -1.11 0.60 
ANGOLA  2.16 1.63  -0.54  -0.52  0.65 0.32 -1.60  -1.37 
ARGENTINA  -0.27 -0.65 0.05 1.61 -0.68 -0.17 1.11  2.79 
AUSTRALIA  -0.62 -0.55 -0.54 -0.73 -0.75 -1.27 0.54  0.26 
AUSTRIA  -0.61 -0.59 -0.57 -0.48 -1.33 -1.21 0.38  0.97 
BAHAMAS  -0.48 -0.48 -0.57 -0.63 -0.54 -0.49 -0.17 -0.27 
BAHRAIN  -0.30 -0.50 -0.40 -0.11 -0.03 -0.72 -1.95 -0.99 
BANGLADESH  0.03 -0.35 1.18 1.22 1.78 -0.22 -0.20 1.18 
BELGIUM  -0.48 -0.54 -0.52 -0.53 -0.62 -1.24 0.68  0.58 
BOLIVIA  0.06 -0.35 0.05 0.80 0.13 -0.37 1.25 1.49 
BOTSWANA  -0.50 -0.63 -0.35 -0.49 -0.65 -0.84 -1.31 -0.75 
BRAZIL  -0.46 -0.43 -0.06 0.45 0.41 -1.03 1.05 0.96 
BRUNEI  -0.48 -0.60 -0.51 -0.44 -0.68 -1.01 -1.44 -1.41 
BULGARIA  -0.65 -0.35 0.42 -0.10 0.84 -0.74 0.31 0.80 
BURKNA FASO  -0.13 -0.44 -0.56 -0.44 1.28 0.05 0.20 -0.75 
CAMEROON  -0.30 -0.35 0.03 -0.45 1.07 -0.38 -1.54 -1.20 
CANADA  -0.56 -0.50 -0.45 -0.44 -0.44 -0.96 0.54 -0.38 
CHILE  0.30 -0.57 2.17 -0.31 0.07 -1.06 -0.41 0.93 
CHINA PR  -0.63 -0.69 1.88 1.84 -0.36 -0.73 -1.49 -1.81 
COLOMBIA  2.67 5.41  -0.48  -0.37  -0.33 -1.09 0.94  1.60 
CONGO DR  0.13 0.35 0.94 0.37 2.81 2.78 -1.16 0.16 
CONGO REP  -0.43 -0.05 -0.25 -0.52 1.14 1.13 -0.79 0.04 
COSTA RICA  -0.51 -0.57 -0.33 -0.52 -0.49 -0.91 0.36  1.22 
CUBA  -0.47 -0.62 -0.41 -0.13 -0.44 -0.84 -1.68 -1.80 
CYPRUS  -0.35 -0.41 -0.53 -0.60 -0.37 -0.92 0.12  0.13 
CZECH REP  -0.71 -0.56 0.96 -0.86 0.83 -0.98 0.14 1.40 
DENMARK  -0.60 -0.58 -0.75 -0.88 -1.39 -1.36 0.88  0.98 
DOMIN REP  -0.36 -0.45 0.51 0.30 -0.46 -0.79 0.21  0.30 
ECUADOR  -0.34 -0.45 -0.11 0.73 -0.74 0.72 1.76 2.63 
EGYPT  0.13 -0.13 0.02 -0.42 -0.17 -0.64 -1.05 -1.08 
EL SALVADOR  2.48  -0.54 -0.30 -0.40 0.05 -1.27 0.45 0.65 
ETH'PIA FDR  0.86 1.58  -0.46  -0.31  -0.19 2.31 -0.95 -0.79 
FINLAND  -0.62 -0.61 -0.83 -0.87 -1.32 -1.43 0.83  0.79 
FRANCE  -0.48 -0.51 0.90 0.64 -0.87 -1.02 1.00  1.08 
GABON  -0.48 -0.53 -0.03 -0.43 0.00 -0.25 -1.41 -1.03 
GAMBIA  -0.48 -0.58 -0.40 -0.53 -0.04 1.02 -1.37 -0.54 
GERMANY  -0.55 -0.57 1.00 -0.49 -1.06 -1.42 -0.12 0.44 
GHANA  -0.37 -0.45 -0.46 -0.55 0.50 -0.38 -1.20 -0.36 
GREECE  -0.23 -0.54 -0.25 -0.56 -0.34 -0.73 1.36  0.29 
GUATEMALA  2.17 0.73 0.36  -0.10  1.50 -0.34 1.86 0.60 
GUINEA  -0.36 -0.29 -0.41 -0.53 1.68 0.11 -0.37 -0.91 
GUINEA-B'AU  -0.38 -0.18 -0.30 -0.56 1.33 2.03 -1.47 0.90 
GUYANA  -0.29 -0.46 -0.43 -0.22 0.41 -0.18 -0.62 0.61 
HAITI  -0.16 0.05 0.94 1.60 4.79 0.79 2.33 0.88 
HONDURAS  0.56  -0.27 -0.18 -0.20 -0.19 -0.40 0.34  0.80   33
HUNGARY  -0.70 -0.58 0.21 -0.76 0.27 -0.80 0.25 1.24 
ICELAND  -0.61 -0.61 -0.88 -0.86 -1.24 -1.55 1.01  0.44 
INDIA  5.40 1.71 5.34 0.02 -0.34 -0.27 1.18  1.77 
INDONESIA  0.93 0.44 0.06 3.83 -0.35 0.48 -1.64 0.09 
IRAN  -0.11 -0.36 -0.14 0.63 0.65 -0.53 -1.25 -1.33 
IRAQ  1.92 0.93  -0.11  -0.30  0.40 0.82 -1.94  -1.93 
IRELAND  -0.50 -0.61 -0.64 -0.65 -0.80 -1.17 0.97  0.64 
ISRAEL  1.02 0.90 2.35 1.36 -0.13 -0.22 1.35  1.61 
ITALY  -0.43 -0.56 -0.15 -0.57 -0.04 -0.12 2.75  2.84 
IVORY COAST  -0.54 -0.30 0.05 0.41 0.08 1.31 -1.31  -0.16 
JAMAICA  -0.41 -0.51 -0.25 0.24 -0.15 -0.98 -0.56 -0.88 
JAPAN  -0.70 -0.67 -0.21 -0.63 -0.34 -0.14 1.51  2.84 
JORDAN  -0.10 -0.56 -0.42 -0.44 0.25 -0.41 -0.56 -0.09 
KENYA  -0.32 -0.45 0.23 0.37 0.10 -0.28 -1.59 -0.64 
KOREA PR  -0.68 -0.69 -0.20 -0.32 -0.46 -0.43 -1.24 -1.42 
KOREA REP  -0.69 -0.58 6.14 0.05 -0.21 -0.69 0.33  0.69 
KUWAIT  -0.33 -0.52 -0.21 -0.64 1.38 -0.92 -1.42 -0.18 
LEBANON  2.59 -0.51 0.01 -0.53 2.69 0.56 0.94 0.23 
LIBERIA  0.96 0.74  -0.34  -0.39  2.20 3.04 -0.84 1.25 
LIBYA  -0.21 -0.50 -0.42 -0.42 0.17 -0.13 -1.73 -1.40 
LUXEMBOURG  -0.60 -0.62 -0.80 -0.75 -1.39 -1.36 0.18  0.00 
MADAGASCAR  -0.17 -0.39 0.24 -0.46 0.48 0.10 -0.64 1.08 
MALAWI  -0.39 -0.50 -0.13 -0.58 0.59 0.00 -1.66 -0.25 
MALAYSIA  0.26  -0.56 -0.46 -0.24 -0.67 -1.03 -0.70 -0.13 
MALI  -0.49 -0.40 -0.18 -0.62 2.24 -0.37 -0.25 -0.39 
MALTA  -0.39 -0.62 -0.35 -0.75 -0.09 -0.98 -0.14 0.35 
MEXICO  -0.32 2.64 0.17 1.25 -0.80 -0.63 -0.92 0.54 
MONGOLIA  -0.76 -0.58 0.23 -0.58 0.67 -0.66 -0.89 -0.22 
MOROCCO  0.42  -0.47 -0.47 -0.64 -0.49 -0.75 -0.62 0.30 
MOZAMBIQUE  1.23  -0.40 -0.53 -0.38 0.38 -0.61 -1.15 -1.06 
MYANMAR  2.47 1.23 0.50 0.31 1.24 -0.34 -0.80 -1.27 
NAMIBIA  0.00 -0.56 0.00 -0.60 0.00 -1.14 0.00 -0.81 
NETHERLANDS  -0.57 -0.61 -0.81 -0.83 -1.52 -1.27 0.04  1.39 
NEW ZEALAND  -0.65 -0.63 -0.74 -0.65 -0.51 -0.79 1.22  1.05 
NICARAGUA  2.21  0.21 0.47 -0.21 0.75 -0.59 -0.28 0.54 
NIGER  -0.38 -0.49 -0.21 -0.49 2.59 2.31 -0.45 1.32 
NIGERIA  -0.25 0.29 0.07 0.72 2.24 1.17 -0.30  -0.03 
NORWAY  -0.63 -0.61 -0.91 -0.82 -1.11 -0.94 1.49  1.63 
OMAN  -0.41 -0.66 -0.46 -0.40 -0.40 -0.59 -1.73 -1.54 
PAKISTAN  -0.04 -0.38 1.87 1.10 2.10 1.24 1.98 1.61 
PANAMA  -0.27 -0.49 0.58 -0.43 0.89 -0.73 1.48 0.33 
PAPUA NEW G  0.30 0.35  -0.62  -0.55 0.13 0.11 1.06 2.43 
PARAGUAY  -0.68 -0.55 0.06 0.62 0.91 0.22 -0.34 0.65 
PERU  3.29 1.95 -0.39 0.63 0.83 0.09 0.88 1.39 
PHILIPPINES  4.01 1.40 2.05  -0.54  0.85 -0.73 0.17 0.68 
POLAND  -0.64 -0.61 1.98 -0.49 0.72 -0.58 -0.30 1.07 
PORTUGAL  -0.48 -0.63 -0.73 -0.85 -0.76 -1.11 0.52  1.16 
QATAR  -0.38 -0.60 -0.44 -0.66 -0.14 -0.55 -1.68 -0.58 
ROMANIA  -0.62 -0.49 0.93 -0.58 0.97 -0.49 -0.38 1.10 
RUSSIAN FED  -0.84 1.74 6.16 0.27 1.07 -0.35 -0.75 1.29   34
SA'U ARABIA  -0.35 -0.56 -0.40 -0.29 -0.20 -0.61 -1.86 -1.75 
SENEGAL  -0.44 -0.30 -0.13 -0.41 0.10 0.69 -1.27 -0.36 
SERBIA/MONT  -0.26 0.51 2.79 1.76 1.46 0.29 -0.38 0.74 
SIERRA LEO  -0.36 1.30 -0.41  -0.57 1.38 3.27 -0.73 1.06 
SINGAPORE  -0.70 -0.71 -0.47 -0.45 -0.52 -0.86 -0.81 -1.43 
SLOVAK REP  -0.71 -0.57 0.98 -0.78 0.83 -0.58 -0.07 1.17 
SO AFRICA  0.89 -0.55 6.59 -0.31 -0.29 -0.33 -1.00 -0.03 
SOMALIA  2.09  0.83 -0.03 0.10 2.13 1.95 -1.17  -1.68 
SPAIN  0.54 0.64 0.40  -0.08  -0.80 -1.07 -0.51 0.32 
SRI LANKA  3.11 3.07  -0.29  -0.74  0.55 -0.36 -0.71 0.15 
SUDAN  2.64 3.19  -0.10  -0.52  4.21 0.59 0.04 -1.73 
SURINAME  0.73  -0.47 -0.53 -0.33 1.12 -0.73 0.78 0.37 
SWEDEN  -0.58 -0.58 -0.89 -0.89 -1.22 -1.08 1.16  1.34 
SWITZERLAND  -0.59 -0.57 -0.75 -0.80 -1.67 -1.61 0.08  0.06 
SYRIA  -0.36 -0.64 -0.50 -0.61 -0.27 -1.26 -1.26 -0.64 
TAIWAN  -0.75 -0.71 0.40 0.16 0.20 -0.48 -1.20 -0.31 
TANZANIA  -0.37 -0.57 -0.50 -0.20 0.30 -0.16 -0.57 -0.80 
THAILAND  0.57  -0.62 -0.29 -0.45 1.92 0.23 1.03 0.80 
TOGO  -0.21 -0.38 0.43 -0.58 1.46 -0.03 -0.92 -0.06 
TRINIDAD  -0.32 -0.38 -0.45 -0.72 0.15 -0.50 -0.23 0.76 
TUNISIA  -0.42 -0.58 -0.32 -0.59 0.20 -0.84 -0.60 -0.84 
TURKEY  1.25 1.86  -0.73  -0.39  0.27 -0.23 0.88 1.41 
UA EMIRATES  -0.24 -0.57 -0.33 -0.49 0.22 -0.90 -2.08 -1.52 
UGANDA  1.76  0.13 -0.72 -0.63 1.66 -0.15 -0.74 -0.81 
UK  1.42 -0.04 0.92 0.21 -0.98 -0.92 -0.10 -0.15 
URUGUAY  -0.28 -0.50 0.10 -0.67 0.07 -0.83 0.90 0.61 
US  -0.61 -0.58 0.24 -0.15 -1.23 -1.36 0.62  0.30 
VENEZUELA  -0.37 -0.42 0.14 1.60 -0.30 -0.55 1.12  1.28 
VIETNAM  -0.22 -0.70 -0.28 -0.39 0.34 -0.76 -0.59 -1.04 
YEMEN REP  0.00 -0.33 0.00 -0.62 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.65 
ZAMBIA  -0.43 -0.47 -0.14 -0.40 0.46 -0.32 -1.00 -0.36 
ZIMBABWE  0.15 -0.42  -0.44 0.12 0.13 -0.53 -0.81 -1.30 
 